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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether employers can induce employees to postpone retirement by offering 
access to training courses that maintain job proficiency. We use unique, matched employer–employee 
surveys for the Dutch public sector, which include detailed information on a wide range of HR 
practices applied in the organization, as well as the expected retirement age of its employees. We find 
that training policies, as reported by employers, are significantly positively related to employee 
expected retirement age, irrespective of whether employees actually participate in training. We show 
that this positive relationship is driven by employees’ positive reciprocal inclinations, indicating that 
provision of training may serve as a tool to motivate older employees in their job and consequently to 
retire later. The provision of training access may therefore complement existing pension reforms in 
many industrialized countries that aim to increase labor-force participation of older workers. 
Robustness analyses indicate that the relationship between offering training access and expected age 
of retirement is unlikely to be driven by reverse causality, self-selection, or the presence of other 
organizational characteristics. 
Keywords: Training access, reciprocity and retirement 
Jel codes: J24, J31, I2  
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1. Introduction 
Many industrialized countries are simultaneously confronted with population aging and an ongoing 
transition of their economy to a knowledge-based economy (see, e.g., Katz and Autor, 1999; 
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2010). These trends represent a major challenge to employees, employers, 
and policy makers (Galasso and Profeta, 2004) and will increase the urgency to encourage older 
employees to remain employable (Daveri and Maliranta, 2006). A major complication, however, is 
that the recent pension reforms in many industrialized countries tend to demotivate workers (see, e.g., 
De Grip et al., 2012; Montizaan et al., 2012; Montizaan and Vendrik, 2014). Therefore, it is important 
to study which policies can best influence workers’ employability.  
Providing training access may be a promising policy instrument to improve the job 
motivation, competencies, and productivity of older workers who have to continue working to a later 
age due to pension system reforms. Several empirical studies found that training participation is 
instrumental in compensating for skills depreciation and maintaining employability (Bishop, 1997; 
Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; De Grip and Van Loo, 2002; Picchio and Van Ours, 2013). 
Moreover, various empirical studies have shown that training participation is positively associated 
with job effort, productivity, and wages (Bartel, 1994, 1995; Barrett and O’Connell, 2001; Conti, 
2005; Dearden et al., 2006;  Zwick, 2006; Fersterer et al., 2008; Konings and Vanormelingen, 2009; 
De Grip and Sauermann, 2012).
2
  
                                                          
2  However, human capital theory also predicts that employers have fewer incentives to invest in older 
employees, because the period in which the benefits of training can be reaped decreases with age (Ben Porath, 
1967; Neumann and Weis, 1995). Older workers may also endure higher psychological costs of training due to a 
lower capacity to learn new skills. These lower investments in human capital can therefore decrease employee 
retirement age (Green, 1993). Various studies showed that training incidence decreases with age. Moreover, 
Bassanini et al. (2005) and Fouarge and Schils (2009) found that training participation of older workers is lower 
in countries with more generous early pension systems, while Montizaan et al. (2010) showed that the 
retrenchment of pension rights leads to higher training participation among older workers in large organizations. 
Similarly, Brunello and Comi (2013) showed that policies that increase the retirement age are effective in 
increasing training participation by senior workers. 
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There are few empirical studies, however, that directly analyzed the relationship between 
training and retirement (e.g., Stenberg et al., 2012; Picchio and Van Ours, 2013). These studies found 
mixed results. Stenberg et al. (2012) found no relationship between training and retirement, while 
Picchio and Van Ours (2013) found that firm-provided training significantly increases future 
employment prospects of older workers. Stenberg et al. (2012) and Picchio and Van Ours (2013), 
however, have in common that they measure the effects of actual training participation of individual 
employees on their retirement behavior. These studies see retirement primarily as an individual labor 
supply decision, but neglect the role of firms’ training provision. This is surprising, since the impact 
of employer policies on employee retirement decisions is well established (e.g., Johnson and 
Neumark, 1996; Dorn and Sousa-Poza, 2010). One of the few studies to consider the role of 
employers is Herrbach et al. (2009), who used survey data on the availability of particular types of 
training from a sample of late-career managers to estimate the effect of training availability on the 
timing of retirement. Consistent with the results of Picchio and Van Ours (2013), these authors found 
that training access significantly increases the retirement age.
3
  
In this study, we investigate whether training access in organizations, as reported by the 
employer, is related to the expected retirement age of their employees. We draw on employer-
provided measures of provision of training access. We build on two linked employer–employee 
surveys conducted in April 2012 in the Dutch public and privatized sector.
4
 The employer survey is 
specifically designed to collect detailed information on organizations’ HR practices targeted at older 
workers, and includes several measures of the extent to which the employer stimulates training 
                                                          
3 Their training measure, however, is based on a survey question, which asks late-career managers to rate the 
availability of training opportunities adapted to their current needs, implying that in cases where managers 
report having no training opportunities relevant to their current needs, it is impossible to determine whether they 
have no training opportunities, or whether they have no training needs. 
4 Although the data set, because of its cross-sectional nature, does not allow us to fully control for biases due to 
unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level, combining employer and employee data at least reduces the 
likelihood of reverse causality, as it is less likely that retirement preferences of individual employees will affect 
the presence of training policies within their organizations. In Section 3.3, we provide robustness analyses that 
address the issue of reverse causality in more detail.  
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participation.
5
 The employee survey elicits respondents’ expected retirement age, in addition to 
detailed questions on employees’ job tasks, actual training participation, and personality traits. 
We show that employees in organizations that provide more training access to older workers 
expect to retire at a significantly later age than those who are employed in organizations that provide 
little or no access to training. A one–standard deviation increase in the provision of training access is 
associated with approximately 1.1 to 3.0 months later retirement. When we compare the size of this 
correlation to the impact of major pension reforms on expected retirement age, it becomes clear that 
training access is of great economic importance. For example, De Grip et al. (2013) find that an 
announced increase in the Dutch statutory retirement age by one year increased the expected 
retirement age by only 3.9 months. Interestingly, for other HR practices targeted at older workers but 
that are unrelated to training, we find no significant relationship with employee retirement age 
expectations. Robustness analyses further indicate that the relationship between training access and 
expected retirement age is unlikely to be driven by reverse causality, self-selection, or organizational 
characteristics. 
This study builds on the existing literature in two ways. First, rather than analyzing the effects 
of actual training participation on retirement behavior, we complement previous retirement studies by 
integrating matched employee and employer data on employer-provided training access and employee 
retirement expectations into one framework. Since we measure training access in an employer survey, 
it is less likely to be confounded by employee characteristics and skill needs than in studies that 
measure training access in employee surveys. The richness of our data further allows us to test the 
robustness of our findings to alternative model specifications (such as the inclusion of firm-specific 
random effects), as well as to the inclusion of additional control variables that, among others, capture 
differences in the financial situation of firms, the role of other HR practices in firms that offer 
training, and self-selection of highly motivated workers into organizations with ample training 
facilities. 
                                                          
5  
Note that these measures capture firm characteristics, and do not necessarily mean that the respondents 
employed in the firms that offer training access actually participate in training. 
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Second, we provide insight into potential mechanisms that drive the positive relation between 
having training access and expected retirement age. We consider whether the relationship between 
training access and retirement expectations is driven by employees’ actual training participation but 
find no evidence for this. Employees in organizations that offer training access to all their older 
workers indeed participate in training more often and expect to retire later. However, the positive 
relationship between training access and expected retirement age remains when we control for 
workers’ training participation. This indicates that access to training may have positive effects on the 
timing of retirement, even if employees do not actually participate in training. 
We show that the relationship between training access and the expected retirement age is 
driven by employees’ positively reciprocal inclinations. Accordingly, we contribute to the growing 
literature that predicts that reciprocity is a key driver of human motivation and labor market outcomes 
(Akerlof, 1982; Pereira et al., 2006; Bowles, 2008). Numerous empirical studies have used a gift-
exchange framework to stress the importance of reciprocity, and find that positively reciprocal 
employees increase their efforts above the required level when treated generously by their employers 
(e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr et al., 1998; Charness, 2000 Brown et al., 2004; Bellemare and Shearer, 
2009; Cohn et al., 2009; Kube et al., 2012). The role of reciprocal behavior by employees in relation 
to the human capital investments by their employer, however, is a relatively unexplored topic. A 
notable exception is Leuven et al. (2005), who applied a gift-exchange framework to explain why 
employers are willing to provide both firm-specific and general training to their employees. Their 
argument is similar to that of the efficiency-wage literature, which predicts that higher effort levels 
can be achieved when employers pay wages above the market-clearing wage (Akerlof, 1982). 
Training improves employees’ individual knowledge, skills, and productivity. When employers are 
willing to offer opportunities for general and firm-specific training, employees may perceive this offer 
as good treatment that signals attention and recognition by the employer, to which they positively 
reciprocate by providing greater effort and higher commitment (Barrett and O’Connell, 2001). 
Employees may alternatively show their appreciation by signaling that they are willing to postpone 
their retirement. Delaying retirement can be beneficial to employers, as this allows them to reap the 
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benefits of investments in the human capital of their current employees for a longer period. Our 
findings thus show that the provision of training access not only improves the skills and productivity 
of employees, but it also has major positive behavioral consequences on the willingness to delay 
retirement. Providing training access could therefore be a useful alternative policy instrument to 
increase labor-force participation by older workers, and may even help to partially counter the 
negative effects that pension reforms have on employee motivation. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, provides 
descriptive statistics, and sets forth information on the representativeness of the estimation sample. 
Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1 Data description 
We use matched employer–employee survey data on the Dutch public and privatized sectors,  
collected in April 2012 (the ROA Public Sector Survey 2012), to examine the relationship between 
provision of organizational training access reported by employers and the expected retirement age of 
their employees. The survey data are matched to administrative data from the Dutch pension fund for 
public sector employees (ABP), which contains information on the number of contribution years to 
the pension fund, the number of working hours, and the specific industry sector in which the 
respondents are employed: public administration, education, or privatized organizations (such as 
public transport companies and oil and gas exploration companies). 
The employee survey data were collected in two stages. In the first stage, a representative, 
randomly selected sample of 57,350 public sector employees born between 1946 and 1975 was 
contacted in the spring of 2012 by ABP via regular post. They were asked to provide their e-mail 
addresses for an online survey on retirement-related issues. In the second stage, in the first week of 
April 2012, we sent an e-mail containing the link to our web-based survey to the 12,600 employees 
who had provided their e-mail addresses. This employee survey contained detailed questions on 
6 
 
retirement expectations, sources of income after retirement, job characteristics, and a battery of 
questions to measure employee personality. Some 6,200 individuals completed the questionnaire.
6
 
For the employer survey, we sent an e-mail in April 2012 to all 2,500 employers in the public 
and privatized sectors with a link to the web-based survey.
7
 This employer survey included detailed 
questions on training and HR practices. The e-mail was sent to HR-advisors, HR-managers and 
managing directors who are responsible for HR practices and all retirement related issues within their 
organizations. The survey was answered by 783 employers. 
In total, we were able to match the survey data of 1,337 employees to the answers of 363 
employers. Because of non-response to questions that are relevant to our analyses, we base our 
estimation sample on 845 employees matched to 284 employers. Although the largest industry sectors 
tend to be over-represented and the smaller sectors tend to be under-represented, the overall 
distribution in our estimation sample of workers across sectors looks rather similar to that in the 
representative sample of workers (see Appendix A). Moreover, the employees matched to their 
employers are similar to those for whom no match is available.
8
 
 
                                                          
6
 Our data set does not include information on actual retirement behavior. To our knowledge, however, there 
exists no data set that provides matched information on training access as reported by employers, actual training 
behavior, as well as actual retirement behavior of employees.   
7
 The e-mail addresses were provided by ABP, which has detailed contact information for each employer, due to 
its role as the public sector’s pension fund. 
8
 T-statistics for the differences in organizational characteristics between employers with and without a match to 
their employees are presented in Table B3, in Appendix B. The table shows that most differences in the variable 
means between both groups are statistically insignificant. Employers whose answers can be matched to the 
answers of their employee, however, have a higher percentage of highly educated workers than those without a 
match. Further, they report more often that their organization is financially sound, but also report a higher 
likelihood that their organization must cut expenses in the coming five years. 
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2.2 Measurement and descriptive statistics 
2.2.1 Main variables 
Our main interest lies in investigating how employees’ retirement expectations are related to the 
training access provided by their employer. Earlier studies that used survey questions to directly 
measure expectations show that this measure may be a good predictor for actual retirement behavior 
(Keane and Runkle, 1990; Das et al., 1999; Dominitz, 2001; Stephens Jr., 2004; Hurd, 2009).
9
 
Retirement expectations are measured by the question At what age do you expect to retire?, to which 
respondents could reply in full years using pre-coded answers ranging from 55 to 70 years-old. 
Our measure of training access is derived from employers’ answers to a set of questions on 17 
HR practices focused on older workers. Employers were asked the following question: To what extent 
does your organization apply the following HR-instruments that are specifically targeted towards 
older employees? For the 17 specific HR practices displayed in Appendix A, employers could answer 
on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 Not applied to any older employee to 5 Applied to all older 
employees.
10
 A factor analysis revealed that these 17 specific HR practices can be grouped into five 
main factors: 1) Training access (e.g., extra courses or training for older workers); 2) Task adaptation 
(e.g., allocate older workers to tasks they are good at); 3) Financial incentives (e.g., demotion); 4) 
Working hours policies (e.g., reduction of working hours for older workers); and 5) Retirement 
policies (e.g., phased retirement). We then standardized these measures of HR practices to mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1. Training access is the key variable of interest in our analysis, and other HR 
                                                          
9
 Few studies have focused on retirement and pension expectations. These studies show that expectations are 
strongly related to retirement decisions, but also provide mixed evidence on the ability of workers to assess 
financial decisions (Duflo and Saez, 2003; Benitez-Silva and Dwyer, 2005; Chan and Stevens, 2008; Alessie et 
al., 2011; Liebman and Luttmer, 2011; Van Rooij et al., 2011, 2012). Montizaan et al. (2010), however, provide 
evidence that Dutch public sector employees are well informed about their pension rights and the implications 
of the changes in the pension system in the past decades for their pension benefits and timing of retirement.  
10
 The 17 items belonging to this survey question are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
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practices serve as control variables measuring the impact of additional HR policies targeted toward 
older employees.
11
 
 
2.2.2 Basic control variables 
We gathered detailed information in the employee survey on workers’ actual training participation, 
willingness to train, personal characteristics and personality traits, job engagement, and main job 
tasks, which we use as control variables in our analysis.
12
 Actual training participation is measured by 
a dummy variable indicating whether the respondents participated in any training course in the 
preceding year, and by the number of training courses in which an employee participated.
13
 For the 
last training course completed, it is known whether it was aimed at general or firm-specific skills, and 
whether the employer initiated this training. This is based on two survey questions: To what extent do 
you agree with the following proposition about the last training course you concluded: The 
knowledge received during this training is transferable to organizations outside the branch in which 
you are currently occupied, where employees answered on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree, and Who took the initiative for the last training course you 
concluded, where employees answered 1) I took the initiative myself; 2) My employer took the 
initiative; 3) We both took the initiative; and 4) Other. Employees’ willingness to train is measured by 
the extent to which they agree with three propositions about their willingness to participate in 1) a 
course aimed at improving their skills for their current job, even when they have to sacrifice leisure 
time for this training; 2) a course aimed at improving skills needed to climb up in position in their 
organization; and 3) a training course aimed at learning skills needed for a new job. Employees 
                                                          
11 
We also performed control analyses in which we used the underlying items of our training indicator and find 
that our main results hold for both items.  
12 
Research shows that personality traits (Fouarge et al., 2013) and job tasks (Görlitz and Tamm, 2012) are 
important determinants of willingness to train and actual training participation.  
13
 The exact wordings of these questions were: “Did you participate in the past year or are you currently 
participating in a training course? Please disregard hobby training courses.” and “In how many training courses 
did you participate in the past year (including those in which you currently participate)?” 
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answered these questions on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly 
agree. 
The survey questions on personal characteristics and personality include, among others, 
education level, marital status, job engagement and the “Big Five” personality traits: openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.
14
 The traits are derived 
from the abbreviated 15-item Big Five validated by Furnham et al. (2003) and McManus and 
Furnham (2006), which includes three items for each personality trait. We constructed the Big Five 
personality traits by taking the average score of the items belonging to each personality trait. Job 
engagement measures the extent to which employees are fully involved in, and enthusiastic about, 
their job, and is based on the short form of the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale (UWES), which has 
been used and validated extensively (see, e.g., Schaufeli et al., 2002). 
Finally, we identify the various job tasks performed by employees by means of 18 questions 
from the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII), also used in Autor and Handel (2013). 
 
2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table B2 of Appendix B presents the observable characteristics of employees in our sample. 
Employees in our estimation sample expect, on average, to retire at the age of 65 and two months. 
Figure 1, however, shows that there are strong peaks in retirement expectations that concentrate 
around the eligibility ages for the state old age pension.
15
 Approximately 28% expect to retire at age 
                                                          
14
 The Big Five personality traits are five broad domains or dimensions of personality used in psychology to 
provide a comprehensive description of human personality; they are based on the Five Factor model (Goldberg, 
1992). These Big Five personality traits are assumed to account for the basic traits in personality without 
overlap between traits. 
15
 The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The first consists of a flat-rate public scheme (AOW) to 
which all residents are entitled as of attainment of age 65 or 67 years, depending on year of birth, regardless of 
whether they are employee, self-employed or never participated in the labor market. This statutory old-age 
pension provides Dutch residents with a pension benefit that in principle guarantees 70% of the net minimum 
wage for a single household and 50% for each partner in a couple (either married or officially living together). 
The eligibility age will be stepwise increased from age 65 to 66 in 2018, and further up to 67 years in 2021. The 
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65, 13% at age 66 and 26% at age 67. There is also a sizable group (28%) of employees who expect to 
retire well before age 65. Conversely, the group of workers who expect to continue working after the 
eligibly age for the state old age pension is relatively small (5%). 
Table B2 further shows that 61% of the employees in our sample participated in a training 
course in the past year. They, on average, participated in 1.41 training courses. Employees are most 
willing to train to improve their skills for their current job, while they are relatively unwilling to 
participate in a course aimed at improving their skills to climb to a higher position in their 
organization. Finally the table shows that 62% of our estimation sample is male, 84% is married, 23% 
is aged between 45 and 54 years, 69% is between 55 and 64 years old, and 72% of the employees are 
highly educated (higher vocational education or university degree), which reflects the fact that these 
workers are over-represented in the public sector.
16
 
 
2.4 Empirical strategy 
To identify and quantify the relationship between training access and expected retirement age, we use 
ordered probit regressions that take the following form: 
 
    kijjijjkij eVTAPRkY    '1 'Pr Xδ       (1) 
 
where Yij
 
stands for the expected retirement age of individual i in firm j, TAj represents the training 
access in firm j, Xij is a vector of individual control variables, Vj is a vector of firm-specific control 
variables, and ei is the error term. Vj includes four indicators that measure the extent to which other 
HR practices focusing on older workers are applied by the employer. Xij includes employee age, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
second pillar refers to the supplementary earnings-related pension. This is a defined-benefit type of pension for 
employees organized at the sector or firm level. This pension can also be used to retire early, before the 
eligibility age for the state pension. The third pillar includes all voluntarily built-up savings that are in addition 
to the first two pillars. Due to the well-established first two pillars of the Dutch pension system, the third pillar 
is less developed in the Netherlands than in other countries. 
16
 Reassuringly, the proportion of highly educated workers in our sample is consistent with that in other datasets, 
such as the Dutch Labor Supply Panel. 
11 
 
education level,
17
 sector dummies, contractual working hours, wage, tenure, gender, marital status, 
personality characteristics, and job tasks of the individual employees. The coefficients , ,  and , 
are to be estimated together with the cut-points 1, …, K, where K represents the number of potential 
answers to the expected age of retirement question. 
We use ordered probit regressions to address the fact that employee retirement expectations 
are concentrated at specific ages. Since there are multiple employee observations for a large number 
of organizations, we use a clustered sandwich estimator to allow for intragroup correlation on the 
organizational level (Rogers, 1993: Wooldridge, 2002). In a robustness analysis, we also estimate a 
hierarchical linear model with an additional random effect to account for unobserved heterogeneity on 
the organizational level. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Main results 
Table 1 presents the ordered probit estimation results of a base specification in which we relate the 
extent of training access in an organization to employee retirement expectations. We control for 
personal characteristics and the four other HR practices targeted toward older workers (Column 1). 
The estimation results show that employee expected age of retirement is positively related to the 
organization’s training access provision: A one standard deviation increase in the extent of training 
access is associated with a 1.1-month higher expected retirement age.
18, 19, 20  
This relationship may 
                                                          
17
 One education dummy that measures whether employees completed education at a lower level, and one 
education dummy that measures whether employees completed higher vocational education or achieved a 
university degree.  
18
 This effect is especially large among high-educated employees. The marginal effect for the interaction 
between the firm’s training policy and the dummy for high education equals 0.203 (not shown in table).  
19
 Figure 2 shows the Kernel distribution of expected retirement ages for employees who work in organizations 
that provide above- and below-median training access. The figure suggests that the provision of training access 
shifts the whole distribution of the expected retirement age to the right.  
20 We also performed the same analysis using the underlying items of our training access indicator. We find a 
significant coefficient of the item “extra education or training participation” of 0.103 with s.e. 0.046, while the 
12 
 
appear to be small at first instance, but when we compare the size of this correlation to the impact of a 
major Dutch pension reform on expected retirement age, it becomes clear that training access is of 
great economic importance. De Grip et al. (2013) found that an announced increase in the Dutch 
statutory retirement age of one year increases expected retirement age by only 3.9 months.
21
 
With respect to the four other HR practices targeted at older workers, we find no significant 
relationship with employee retirement age expectations.  Table 1 further presents the results of 
analyses in which we subsequently add the Big Five personality traits (Column 2), along with 18 job 
task indicators (Column 3). These variables are added because employees’ personalities and the tasks 
they perform on the job could confound the relationship between having training access and employee 
retirement expectations.
22
 The marginal effect of our training access indicator on expected retirement 
age hardly changes and remains statistically significant. We find that both conscientiousness and 
neuroticism are negatively related to expected retirement age.
23
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
coefficient of the item “training aimed at rethinking retirement and the professional career” is 0.035 with s.e. 
0.025. 
21 
Other studies, which focused on the effects of actual pension reforms, or used simulation studies, found 
similar results. Mastrobuoni (2009) found that a rise in the eligibility age for retirement in the U.S. by two 
months in 2003 postponed the actual retirement age only 1 month. Fields and Mitchell (1984) and Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1985, 2005) simulate that a rise in the eligibility age in the U.S. with two years leads to a two-month 
increase in the retirement age. Van Erp and De Hek (2009) simulated that a one-year increase in the eligibility 
age of the state old-age pension in the Netherlands leads to a one-month increase in the retirement age.  
22
 Previous studies have found a strong, direct relationship between job characteristics, such as high physical 
demands, repetitive working conditions, and early retirement (Filer and Petri, 1988). By controlling for the main 
job tasks, we reduce the likelihood that job characteristics, such as the time that employees perform tasks from 
which they can learn, which is likely to be positively correlated to training access and the expected retirement 
age, are driving our results.  
23
Hurd et al. (2012) showed that conscientious people are better financially prepared for retirement, while 
Robinson et al. (2010) found that neurotic individuals more often report ‘negative circumstantial motives’ for 
retirement. 
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3.2 Why is there a positive impact from training policies on expected retirement age? 
The above-described results show that employees of organizations that provide more training access 
expect to retire later than those who work in organizations that do not provide training access to their 
employees. The question is what are the mechanisms behind this relationship? We will here test the 
relevance of two possible mechanisms. One explanation for the positive impact of training policies on 
expected retirement age may be that training access directly affects a worker’s participation in 
training, while these human capital investments in turn influence employee labor productivity and 
wages, thereby increasing the opportunity costs of early retirement. However, employees may also 
perceive the provision of training access as an investment by their employer in the work relationship. 
It is therefore important to: 1) disentangle the role of training access from the influence of actual 
employee training participation, and 2) establish to what extent an employee’s appreciation of their 
employer’s training access policy induces them to positively respond by increasing their effort and/or 
retiring later (Barrett and O’Connell, 2001). 
 
3.2.1 Actual training participation 
Table 2 shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression where we relate training access for 
older workers offered by the firm to employees’ actual participation in training. The dependent 
variable is based on the survey questions on whether the employee participated in a training course 
last year, who took the initiative for the training and the extent to which the skills learned were 
transferable to other employers. It is coded 0 when employees participated in no training course, 1 
when employees received a firm-specific training course (employees replied with a score of 3 or 
below to the question on whether the knowledge is transferable) without any initiative from their 
employer, 2 when they participated in a firm-specific training course with support of their employer 
(either they report that their employer took the initiative or that both took the initiative), 3 when they 
received a general training course without the support of their employer (employees replied with a 
score of 4 or 5 to the question on whether the knowledge is transferable), and 4 when they received a 
general training course with support from the employer. 
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The table shows that employees in organizations with strongly developed training policies 
indeed more often participate in general training courses with support from their employer, while 
access to training for older workers is not significantly related to worker participation in firm-specific 
training. A one–standard deviation increase in the training access indicator is associated with a 3.6% 
higher likelihood of participating in general training with support of the employer. Hence, it is 
possible that the positive relationship between training access and expected retirement age runs 
through the actual participation in general training. 
 We therefore re-estimate the specification in Column 3 of Table 1, in which we control for 
actual training participation and the number of training courses. From Table 2, we observe that the 
correlation between the training access indicator and expected retirement age is robust to the inclusion 
of individual training participation.
24
 Actual individual training incidence is not significantly related 
to the timing of retirement, which can be explained by the fact that the training decision is highly 
endogenous with respect to both the motivation and the job tasks of individual employees, which are 
already controlled for in the model. The correlation between number of training courses and expected 
retirement age is statistically significant, but small. One additional training course leads to a 0.7-
month higher expected retirement age. 
 
3.2.2 Positive reciprocity 
The above results thus suggest that providing training access to older workers within organizations 
may induce later retirement, beyond workers’ actual training participation. A possible explanation for 
this finding is that the positive correlation between the organization’s training policies and the 
individual expected retirement age is driven by employees’ positive reciprocal inclinations. This 
conjecture is based on abundant evidence provided by experimentalists and psychologists, who 
showed that reciprocity is a key driver of human motivation and labor market outcomes (see, e.g., 
                                                          
24
 We also estimate the model including dummy variables, indicating the specific type of individual training 
participation (general or firm-specific with or without support of the employer). The results are robust to using 
these alternative measures.  
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Akerlof, 1982; Bowles, 2008). In particular, Leuven et al. (2005) showed that positive reciprocal 
inclinations of employees are critical to explaining why employers are willing to provide firm-specific 
as well as general training to their employees.
25
 Their argument is that training positively affects the 
knowledge, skills and productivity of individual employees, who may therefore perceive the 
willingness of their employer to offer training opportunities and to pay for both firm-specific and 
general training as a gift, or as a signal of attention and recognition by the employer, for which they 
would like to positively reciprocate. Positive behavior by employers may thus increase the job 
motivation and engagement of positively reciprocal employees, who then may reciprocate the 
favorable action by their employer, by increasing their effort at work and postponing retirement. The 
postponement of retirement can be beneficial to employers, in particular when they experience labor 
shortages, as it allows them to reap the benefits of their investments in the human capital of their 
current employees for a longer period.  
 We test whether the positive correlation between organizations’ training policies and 
employee expected retirement age is driven by employees’ positive reciprocal inclinations. For this 
purpose, we use a measure of reciprocity based on the scale developed by Perugini et al. (2003), who 
performed comprehensive validation tests and assessed the predictive power of their reciprocity scale 
for the behavior of participants in ultimatum games in laboratory experiments conducted in the United 
Kingdom and Italy. The three items with the highest loadings in their principal components analysis 
for positive reciprocity are included in our data set.
26
 Respondents had to indicate how well they 
identified themselves with each of the following three statements: 1) If someone does me a favor, I am 
prepared to return it; 2) I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before; 3) I am 
ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before. Participants responded on a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (does not apply to me at all) to 5 (applies perfectly to me). We 
                                                          
25
 Among others, Pischke (2001) showed that, as opposed to what can be expected based on the standard human 
capital theory, workplace training is often of a general nature and is provided by employers at no direct cost for 
the employer.  
26
 These items were also included in the 2005 German Socio Economic Panel wave. The behavioral validity of 
these items is further investigated and confirmed by Dohmen et al. (2009) and Montizaan et al. (2012).  
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first take the arithmetic average of a respondent’s answers to these three questions, and compute the 
sample median value. Our measure of positive reciprocity equals 1 for respondents whose score is 
above the median, 0 otherwise.
27
 
 Table 4 shows the estimation results of an ordered probit regression with the interaction term 
between the positive reciprocity indicator and training access; this shows a statistically significant 
positive interaction effect between positive reciprocity and training access.
28
 Positive reciprocal 
employees within organizations with unlimited training access expect to retire 3 months later than 
positively reciprocal employees who work in organizations which do not offer any training 
opportunities to their older employees, and 1.5 months later than non-positive reciprocal employees 
who work in organizations with training access. This suggests that the positive relationship between 
training access and expected retirement age is indeed stronger for employees with strongly positively 
reciprocal inclinations.
29
 
 
3.3 Robustness 
While the results in Tables 1–4 highlight the importance of giving training access to older workers as 
a potential motivating stimulus for later retirement, the relevance of the finding may be limited 
                                                          
27
 We also perform interaction analyses with the arithmetic average of a respondent’s answers to the three 
reciprocity questions, and find similar results.   
28  We find similar results when we use the underlying items of our training access indicator. We find a 
significant coefficient of the interaction term positive reciprocity and a dummy indicator which indicates 
whether employers provided “extra education or training participation” (coefficient 0.431 with s.e. 149), as well 
as a significant coefficient of the interaction with “training aimed at rethinking retirement and the professional 
career” (coefficient 0.450 with s.e. 0.161). 
29
 We also perform an ordered probit regression with the interaction term between the positive reciprocity 
indicator and training access on the quit intentions of the younger employees in our sample (employees below 
the median age in the sample). Quit intentions are measured by the survey question Are you presently searching 
for a new job, or did you search for a new job in the past year? Consistent with our estimations on expected 
retirement age, we find that positively reciprocal employees who work in organizations that provide training 
access are less likely to quit (coefficient of the interaction effect is -0.404 with s.e. 0.213). We do not find this 
result for older employees, which can be explained by the fact that the quit rate of this group is much lower.   
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because of self-selection of highly educated and motivated employees into organizations with 
attractive training policy-practices, or by the fact that organizations’ training policies are endogenous. 
First, the estimation results could reflect self-selection of highly educated and motivated 
employees into organizations with attractive training policy-practices, leading to both a higher 
average retirement age and prevalence of training policies within these organizations. Column 1 of 
Table 5 shows ordered probit estimation results of the specification used in Column 3 of Table 1, in 
which several variables are added to control for the education level within firms and motivation of the 
employees.
30
 We here include the percentage of highly educated employees in the organization as 
reported by the employer, individual willingness to train, and job engagement. The latter two 
variables measure the extent to which employees are involved in and motivated for their work 
(Schaufeli et al., 2002). The inclusion of these control variables slightly reduces the marginal effect of 
the firm’s training access indicator, but it remains statistically significant. As expected, we find that 
both employee willingness to train for their current job and their willingness to train for a new job are 
positively related to expected retirement age. The percentage of highly educated employees and the 
willingness to train to advance in the organization are, however, not statistically significantly 
correlated with the timing of retirement. 
Second, one could conjecture that giving training access to the workforce and individual 
retirement expectations are simultaneously influenced by the productivity of the workforce within an 
organization. Bartel and Sicherman (1993) showed that retirement age and on-the-job training are 
positively correlated with exposure to gradual technical change and productivity growth. In the 
estimation in Column 2 of Table 5, we control for self-assessed individual productivity growth. This 
variable is based on the following question in the employee survey: Suppose your productivity 
equaled 100 one year ago. How would you then assess your productivity at this moment? Smaller 
                                                          
30
 All additional control analyses were also performed on the model with the interaction term between positive 
reciprocity and training access as reported in Table 4. The significant interaction effect of training access and 
positive reciprocity on expected retirement age remains, even when we include all the control variables reported 
in Table 5.  
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than 100 means less productive and larger than 100 means more productive. Further, since bad health 
often increases the likelihood of early retirement, we also include a self-assessed measure of 
employee health and the number of sick days in the past year. However, the negative correlation 
between training access offered by the firm and the expected retirement age of its employees remains 
unaffected when we include these individual productivity growth and health indicators. 
Third, it could be that organizations that offer training access for older workers are able do so 
because of better financial conditions, the presence of a more active personnel department, or other 
unobserved organizational characteristics. To address these issues, we added several variables that 
measure the financial condition of the organization and that provide information on the overall HR 
management of the organization. Financial condition is measured by two questions in the employer 
survey: How would you describe the financial condition of your organization, with answer categories 
ranging from 1 Very bad to 5 Very good; and Has there been any reduction in the organizational 
workforce in the past year. The characteristics of general HR management of the organization are 
extensively measured by 11 indicators derived from a factor analysis on employers’ answers to a list 
of 48 questions on the extent to which various HR practices are applied within the organization.
31
 
Further, we estimate a hierarchical linear model with a random effect that accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the organizational level. Columns 3–5 of Table 5 show that our results are robust to 
inclusion of these controls for financial conditions, overall HR management as well as time invariant 
unobserved characteristics of the organizations.
32
 The size of the marginal effect of offering training 
                                                          
31
 Table B3 in Appendix B describes and shows descriptive statistics for these 11 HR indicators.  
32 Postponing retirement can be considered as a positive reciprocal action by the employee only when their 
employers are also willing to keep them to a higher age. We therefore separately estimate the ordered probit 
regression with the interaction terms between the positive reciprocity indicator and training access for 
employees who work in organizations that are financially sound or did not experience a reduction in their 
workforce in the past year, and those who are employed by organizations with financial difficulties or which had 
to reduce their workforce. Reassuringly, we find that the interaction effect between training access and positive 
reciprocity is large and statistically significant in the regressions for employees of organizations that are in good 
financial condition (coefficient 0.254 with s.e. 0.103) or did not experience a reduction in the workforce 
(coefficient 0.390 with s.e. 0.189), while there is no significant interaction effect for employees of organizations 
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access to older workers on expected retirement age increases slightly to 0.127 when we control for 
overall HR management of the organization and to 0.236 when the organization random effect is 
included. This suggests that organizations that offer training access to their older workforce have 
unobserved characteristics that induce early retirement, which leads to underestimation of the 
relationship between offering training access and expected retirement age. 
 Finally, we test whether our results are due to reverse causality. It is unlikely that reverse 
causality would play an important role in our previous estimations, due to the fact that we link 
training access reported by employers to the individual retirement expectations of the employees in 
our estimation sample. Nevertheless, it could be the case that the individual expected retirement age is 
higher due to the fact that employees in certain organizations retire, on average, later than in other 
organizations. In turn, we could then expect that organizations with a late average retirement age are 
more willing to design training policies for their older employees. We therefore conducted two tests to 
establish whether reverse causality biases our estimation results. For the first test, we use 
administrative data on actual retirement behavior of male public sector workers born in 1949 or 
1950.
33
 The data were collected from the Dutch pension fund in 2013 for all male public sector 
employees in these two respective birth cohorts, with the advantage that the great majority of the men 
in this data set is already retired or currently retiring. For each organization, we calculate the 
percentage of employees who were born in 1950, the percentage of employees born in 1949 or 1950 
who are currently retired, and their average retirement age. We subsequently match these 
organizational indicators on actual retirement behavior to our data set and add them as additional 
control variables in our estimations. In case of reverse causality, we would expect that the inclusion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with financial difficulties (coefficient 0.044 with s.e. 0.324) or which experienced a reduction of the workforce 
(coefficient 0.130 with s.e. 0.134). These results therefore suggest that positively reciprocal employees expect to 
retire later only when their employer is also more likely to be willing to keep them to a later age. 
33
 These data are part of a panel database used in other studies to measure the effects of a major pension reform 
in the Dutch public sector that occurred in 2006 (e.g., Montizaan et al., 2010; De Grip et al., 2012; Montizaan et 
al., 2012; and Montizaan and Vendrik, 2014). We do not have administrative information on actual retirement 
behavior for other birth cohorts.  
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the organizational average retirement age of these cohorts should diminish the marginal effect of the 
training access indicator. The estimation results in Column 1 of Table 6 show that the coefficients of 
the percentage of a firm’s employees born in 1949 and 1950 who are currently retired and the firm’s 
average retirement age of these two cohorts have the right sign, but are statistically insignificant. 
More importantly, however, inclusion of these variables does not affect our conclusion on the relation 
between training access and expected retirement. 
In the second test, we include the average expected retirement age of colleagues within the 
same organization as an additional control variable in our model. In our survey, 738 employees work 
in an organization in which more than one employee responded to the employee survey. These 
employees have a median number of four colleagues for whom we observe an expected retirement 
age. Again, in case of reverse causality, we would expect that the inclusion of the average expected 
retirement age of colleagues should diminish the marginal effect of the training access indicator. The 
estimation results in Column 2 of Table 6 show that the expected retirement age of workers is also not 
affected by the retirement expectations of their colleagues, and that inclusion of this variable does not 
affect the relationship between training access and expected retirement age. These two robustness 
checks suggest that the relationship between training access and expected age of retirement may be 
causal.
34
 
 
                                                          
34
 We also estimated an instrumental variables (IV) model in which the existence of bonus payment schemes is 
used to instrument for the firm’s training policy (results available on request). Bonus payment schemes provide 
monetary gift incentives, and may be a substitute for non-monetary gift incentives such as the provision of 
training access. This makes bonus payment a potentially suitable instrument for training provision by the firm. 
The first stage of the IV-estimation subsequently showed that the extent to which bonus payments are applied in 
organizations is indeed significantly negatively related to the degree that training policies are applied. In the 
second stage, we observe that training policies still have a significant positive effect on expected retirement age. 
These results further suggest that training policies may have a causal impact on retirement expectations. 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether a firm’s training access policy targeted at the older workforce can be 
successful in stimulating the employability and labor market attachment of older workers. For this 
purpose, we employ a unique, matched employer–employee data set that allows us to investigate 
whether policies providing organizational training targeted at older workers, as reported by 
employers, is related to the expected retirement age of their employees. The data set builds on two 
linked employer–employee surveys conducted in April 2012 in the Dutch public and privatized sector: 
an employer survey specifically designed to collect detailed information on organizations’ HR 
practices, and that includes several measures of the extent to which training investments of older 
workers are stimulated by their employers, and an employee survey that elicits expected retirement 
age. 
We find that offering training access to older employees is significantly positively related to 
the expected retirement age of a firm’s workforce. A one–standard deviation increase in the degree to 
which employers offer training access is associated with an approximately 1.1-to-3.0-month higher 
expected retirement age. We show that this relationship is not likely to be driven by self-selection of 
highly educated and motivated employees in organizations with extensive training policies, higher 
labor productivity, better financial situation of the organization, overall HR management or reverse 
causality. 
Moreover, the positive correlation between offering training access to older workers and 
expected retirement age is robust to controlling for employees’ actual training participation. This 
suggests that access to training has positive effects on the timing of retirement over and beyond 
workers’ actual training participation. We show that this positive correlation between generous 
training access and the expected retirement age of individual employees is strongly driven by 
employees’ positive reciprocal inclinations, especially of employees who work in organizations that 
are financially sound and that did not reduce their workforces in the preceding year. Positively 
reciprocal employees employed in organizations that offer training access to older workers on average 
expect to retire 3 months later than positively reciprocal employees who work in organizations with 
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no training access, and 1.5 months later than non-positively reciprocal employees of organizations 
that offer training access. This shows that provision of training access to older workers may not only 
improve the skills and productivity of employees, but also have major positive behavioral 
consequences that enable firms to reap the benefits of investments in the human capital of their 
workforce for a longer period. 
By confirming that advanced organizational training policies can contribute to later retirement 
of specific groups of employees, these findings have great relevancy for public policies that aim to 
retain older workers in the labor market for a longer period. Our results strongly suggest that 
behavioral factors play a critical role in this relationship. The provision of training access may be a 
useful instrument that can complement pension system reforms that aim to increase the labor force 
participation rate of older workers as currently applied in many industrialized countries. Training 
access may further help to reduce the substantial negative effects of pension reforms on worker 
motivation and mental health documented by De Grip et al. (2012), Montizaan et al. (2012), and 
Montizaan and Vendrik (2014). The results underscore the need for further research on the complex 
relationship between organizational training policies and employee retirement behavior. 
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Figure 1 
Retirement expectations 
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Figure 2 
Retirement expectations of employees with and without training access (above / below median)* 
 
 
* Kernel density estimate (epanechnikov). 
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Table 1 
Employer-provided training access and expected retirement age 
Dependent variable: expected retirement age (1) (2) (3) 
HR practices focused on older workers    
Training access 0.091** 0.090** 0.092** 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) 
Task adaptation -0.062 -0.072 -0.072 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) 
Financial incentives -0.021 -0.018 -0.014 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Working hours policies 0.009 0.008 -0.010 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) 
Retirement policies 0.004 0.008 -0.003 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Personal characteristics    
Age 45-54 (age 35-44 is ref) -0.142 -0.155 -0.128 
 (0.163) (0.160) (0.163) 
Age 55-64 -0.492*** -0.494*** -0.464*** 
 (0.147) (0.145) (0.141) 
Low education 
(intermediate level of education is ref) 
-0.120 -0.156 -0.038 
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.180) 
High education 0.092 0.085 0.039 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.113) 
Government sector 0.079 0.052 0.069 
 (0.112) (0.108) (0.118) 
Education sector 0.248* 0.224* 0.197 
 (0.130) (0.123) (0.131) 
Wage (ln) -0.143 -0.232* -0.359** 
 (0.138) (0.131) (0.147) 
Contractual working hours 0.648** 0.685** 0.767*** 
 (0.273) (0.273) (0.289) 
Tenure -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male 0.014 0.010 -0.007 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.094) 
Married -0.290*** -0.276*** -0.260*** 
 (0.085) (0.087) (0.091) 
Personality traits    
Neuroticism  -0.103*** -0.112*** 
  (0.038) (0.040) 
Extraversion  0.039 0.032 
  (0.057) (0.054) 
Openness  0.084 0.072 
  (0.059) (0.059) 
Agreeableness  -0.059 -0.043 
  (0.039) (0.038) 
Conscientiousness  -0.068* -0.078** 
  (0.039) (0.038) 
Job tasks No No Yes 
Observations 845 845 845 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for clustering on organization 
level. The table shows ordered probit estimates. The HR practices measures are derived from a factor analysis 
on employers’ answers to 17 questions on HR practices focused on older workers. The Big Five personality 
traits are derived from the abbreviated 15-item Big Five validated by Furnham et al. (2003) and McManus and 
Furnham (2006). We use 18 variables to identify the job tasks performed by employees. These are based on 18 
questions from the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII) Survey. The relevancy of these job task 
measures is validated by Autor and Handel (2013). 
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Table 2 
Employer-provided training access and employee training participation 
 
No training Specific 
training 
without 
support 
Specific 
training 
with support 
General 
training 
without 
support 
General 
training 
with support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Training access -0.010 0.000 -0.016 -0.001 0.026** 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personality traits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job tasks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 861 861 861 861 861 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for clustering on organization 
level. The table shows marginal effects of a multinomial logit on different types of training participation of 
individual employees with and without support by the employer, including all control variables of the 
specification presented in Column 3 of Table 1. 
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Table 3 
Employer-provided training access, actual training participation, and expected retirement age 
Dependent variable: Expected retirement age (1) 
Training access 0.085
** 
 (0.043) 
Human capital investments  
Training participation -0.063 
 (0.081) 
Number of training courses 0.057** 
 (0.027) 
HR practices focused on older workers Yes 
Personal characteristics Yes 
Personality traits Yes 
Job tasks Yes 
Observations 844 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for clustering on organization 
level. The table shows ordered probit estimates, including all control variables of the specification presented in 
Column 3 of Table 1. 
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Table 4 
Training access and expected retirement age: positive reciprocity 
Dependent variable: Expected retirement age (1) (2) 
Training access 0.090** 0.021 
 (0.043) (0.053) 
Positive reciprocity 0.051 -0.120 
 (0.094) (0.100) 
Training access x positive reciprocity  0.243** 
  (0.100) 
HR practices focused on older workers Yes Yes  
Personal characteristics Yes Yes 
Personality traits Yes Yes 
Job tasks Yes Yes 
Human capital investments Yes Yes 
Observations 834 834 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for clustering on organization 
level. Column 1 of the table shows ordered probit estimates which include the same control variables as in 
Column 3 of Table 1. 
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Table 5 
Alternative explanations: selection, productivity, financial condition of the organization and 
overall HR-management 
Dependent variable: Expected retirement age  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Training access 0.083
** 0.095** 0.090** 0.127** 0.236** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.053) (0.105) 
Characteristics of workforce      
Percentage of highly educated workers -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Prepared to participate in a course aimed at improving 
skills for current job 
0.095** 0.105** 0.107** 0.079* 0.151 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.097) 
Prepared to participate in a course aimed at improving 
skills needed to advance in the organization 
0.057 0.040 0.042 0.061 0.106 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.102) 
Prepared to participate in a course aimed at learning 
skills needed for a new job 
0.100** 0.105** 0.104* 0.051 0.057 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.118) 
Job engagement 0.040 0.034 0.033 0.016 0.013 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.079) 
Productivity indicators      
Increase of productivity (self-assessed)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bad health (self-assessed)  -0.073 -0.077 -0.121* -0.219 
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.071) (0.149) 
Number of sick days (self-assessed)  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Financial condition of organization      
Financial condition   0.040 0.084 0.187 
   (0.050) (0.064) (0.128) 
Likelihood that organization has to cut expenses in 
coming five years 
  0.046 0.047 0.127 
   (0.054) (0.066) (0.133) 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personality traits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job tasks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Human capital investments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall HR management No No No Yes Yes 
Organization random effects No No No No Yes 
Observations 838 807 807 677 677 
      
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for clustering on organization 
level. Columns 1–4 show ordered probit estimates with the same control variables as in Column 3 of Table 1. 
Column 5 shows the results of a hierarchical linear model with random effects. The HR practices measures are 
derived from a factor analysis on employers’ answers to 17 questions on the use of HR practices that are focused 
on older workers. The Big Five personality traits are derived from the abbreviated 15-item Big Five validated by 
Furnham et al. (2003) and McManus and Furnham (2006). Job tasks are measured using 18 questions from the 
Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII) Survey. The relevancy of these job task measures are validated by 
Autor and Handel (2013). Overall personnel management is measured by 11 indicators derived from a factor 
analysis on employers’ answers to 48 questions on the extent to which HR-instruments are applied within the 
firm. 
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Table 6 
Training access and expected retirement age: controlled for organizational retirement patterns  
Dependent variable: Expected retirement age (1) (2) 
Training access 0.126
*** 0.096** 
 (0.043) (0.046) 
Mean retirement age of 1949/1950 cohorts who were 
employed in the organization 
0.038  
 (0.048)  
Percentage of retirees of 1949/1950 cohorts in the 
organization 
-0.094  
 (0.226)  
Percentage of employees born in 1950 in the 
organization’s workforce 
0.022  
 (0.239)  
Mean expected retirement age of colleagues  -0.016 
  (0.042) 
HR practices focused on older workers Yes Yes 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes 
Personality traits Yes Yes 
Job tasks Yes Yes 
Human capital investments Yes Yes 
Observations 759 738 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for clustering on organization 
level. Columns 1 and 2 show ordered probit estimates, which include the same control variables as Column 3 of 
Table 1. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1 
Employer survey questions on HR practices focused on older workers 
Employer survey questions on HR practices focused on older workers Scale 
To what extent does your organization apply the following HR instruments specifically 
targeted toward older employees? 
 
1) Adaptation of the workplace 
2) Giving tasks in which they perform relatively well 
3) Task relief 
4) Extra education or training participation 
5) Training aimed at rethinking retirement and the professional career 
6) Mentor function for older employees 
7) Old age holiday days 
8) Senior leave 
9) Demotion 
10) Wage decrease 
11) Promotion 
12) Shortening of labor hours 
13) Part-time retirement 
14) Extra investment in life course savings plans 
15) Allowing employees to continue working after age 65 
16) Wage guarantee 
17) Departure schemes 
Five-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 “Applied to no older 
employee” to 5 “Applied to all 
older employees.”  
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 in Appendix B displays information on the distribution of employees over the various 
subsectors in the representative sample (Columns 1 and 2), the response rates to the employee survey 
(Column 3), the distribution of workers over subsectors in the employee survey (Columns 4 and 5) 
and the distribution of employees over sectors in the matched employer-employee data (Columns 6 
and 7). The largest subsectors in the representative sample of public sector employees are Primary and 
Secondary Education (25.8%), Municipalities (19.8%) and the National Government (13.4%). 
Column 3 shows that the response rates to the employee survey are very similar across sectors, at 
approximately 11%. The lowest response rate is found for academic hospitals (8.2%), while the 
highest response rate is found for workers in intermediate vocational education (12.8%). 
The representativeness of the estimation sample is further explored in Table B2, which 
presents the observable characteristics of employees with and without a match to their employer in 
Columns 1 and 2, respectively. Column 3 shows the t-statistic for the test of whether employee 
characteristics differ between employees with or without a match to their employer. We find that the 
between-group differences are small. There are only weakly significant differences (at the 10% level) 
in the number of 45–55 year-olds and highly educated, and in job engagement between the groups of 
employees with or without a match. Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that employees who can 
be matched to their employer are similar to those for whom no match is available. 
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Table B1 
Employee response rates by subsector 
 
Representative 
sample 
Response 
rate 
employee 
survey 
Distribution of 
workers in employee 
survey 
Distribution of 
workers in employee 
survey after match 
with employer data 
Sector Total % % Total % Total % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
National government 7,699 13.4 11.8 911 14.7 314 23.5 
Defense (civilian personnel) 2,322 4.1 10.3 240 3.9 NA NA 
Provinces and district water 
boards 
1,923 3.4 10.8 208 3.4 25 1.9 
Municipalities 11,340 19.8 10.2 1157 18.7 297 22.2 
Police 2,903 5.1 10.8 313 5.1 31 2.3 
Primary and secondary 
education 
14,772 25.8 10.9 1610 26.1 374 28 
Intermediate vocational 
education 
3,331 5.8 12.8 428 6.9 50 3.7 
Higher vocational education 2,259 3.9 11.8 267 4.3 71 5.3 
Universities 2,695 4.7 10.5 282 4.6 75 5.6 
Academic hospitals 2,723 4.8 8.2 223 3.6 NA NA 
Water, energy and public 
utilities 
2,442 4.3 10.7 261 4.2 26 1.9 
Voluntary members 1,992 3.5 9.7 194 3.1 46 3.4 
Other 949 1.7 9.0 85 1.4 28 2 
 
57,350 100 10.8 6,179 100 1,337 100 
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Table B2 
Employee characteristics with and without a match to the employer 
 
Average 
employees with  
a match 
Average 
employees 
without a match 
t-stat 
difference 
Expected retirement age 65.13 65.01 1.45 
Average score on positive reciprocity 3.98 3.99 0.79 
Age 45-54 (age 35-44 is ref) 0.23 0.21 1.69* 
Age 55-64 0.69 0.71 1.17 
Low education 0.05 0.04 0.34 
High education 0.72 0.70 1.90* 
Wage (ln) 10.9 10.9 0.52 
Contractual working hours 0.89 0.89 1.28 
Tenure 12.9 13.2 0.82 
Male 0.62 0.62 0.23 
Married 0.84 0.83 0.69 
Training participation 0.61 0.60 0.94 
Number of training courses 1.41 1.32 1.32 
 
Prepared to participate in a course aimed at 
improving skills for the present job 3.70 3.67 1.17 
 
Prepared to participate in a course aimed at 
improving skills needed to climb up in position in 
their organization 3.00 3.01 0.32 
 
Prepared to participate in a course aimed at 
learning skills needed for a new job 3.43 3.44 0.18 
Job engagement 3.03 3.18 1.85* 
Increase of productivity (self-assessed) 110.9 103.3 1.10 
Bad health (self-assessed) 1.92 1.95 0.96 
Number of sick days (self-assessed) 6.3 6.7 0.56 
 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. We also performed the same test on the 18 job task indicators used in 
Table 1 and found no significant differences in the job tasks of employees with and without a match to the 
employer data. 
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Table B3 
Organizational characteristics with and without a match to employee 
 
t-stat difference in 
means 
HR practices focused on older workers 
(standardized) 
 
Training access 0.77 
Task adaptation 0.99 
Financial incentives 0.58 
Working hours policies 0.05 
Retirement policies 0.87 
Other organizational characteristics  
Percentage of highly educated workers 16.11*** 
Financial condition 12.7*** 
Likelihood that the organization must reduce 
expenses in the coming five years 
10.2*** 
Overall HR management (standardized)  
Overwork and shift work 1.54 
Flexible work hours 1.42 
Lifestyle and health investments 0.83 
Career advice and coaching 1.46 
Stimulating competences and working as an 
independent 
1.08 
Vitality and working conditions  0.81 
Demotion and promotion  0.28 
Communication and assessment 0.83 
Internal and external mobility 0.52 
Bonus payments and gratifications 0.16 
Sabbatical leave and employee saving schemes 0.05 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
